Beachie Creek FIRE

OR-WIF-200299
September 4th thru September 16th, 2020

Brian Gales
Incident Commander

Lonnie Click
Deputy Incident Commander

Larry Nickey
Covid Liaison Officer
**Objectives**

- Ensure firefighter and public safety by using strategies and tactics that mitigate known and anticipated hazards while providing for the highest probability of success.
- Be cognizant of COVID-19 procedures.
- Provide accurate and timely fire information through interagency and public coordination.
- Protect cultural values and natural resources in the fire area.

**Incident Commander**

**Key Decisions**

- Evacuate ICP, utilize 911 to request Fire, Law Enforcement support, and request power be shut off in camp area.
- Include Law Enforcement in the Incident Command structure to ensure the long-term stability and recovery of the incident.

**Significant Events**

- On the evening of September 7th, a significant East wind event occurred causing numerous new fires starts in the Highway 22 corridor, many of these fires are believed to be caused by downed power lines. These new fires caused the evacuation of ICP, the Gates community, and potentially others down valley.
- The Beachie fire subsequently joined with these new fires as well as the Lionshead fire which appears to have burned into the community of Detroit.

**Notable成功的s**

- Unified with Oregon State Fire Marshall Green Team at 0700 on September 8th to support immediate rescue mode operations for the Highway 22 corridor.
- Coordinate with local mutual aid resources, Law Enforcement and adjacent IMT’s to secure the Beachie Fire perimeter.

**Significant Challenges and Resolutions**

- Re-locating ICP to a safe and adequate operational location for the long-term management of the incident.
- Overcoming the loss of much of the IMT’s gear and establishing immediate operability and support to all assigned resources and emergency responders. Much appreciation to the Green Team for providing Team 13 with starter kits of personal supplies.
**Medical Statistics**

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**Personnel**

| Personnel Assigned               | Avg. 500 | (maximum day) 570 |
| Total hours worked               | 96,000   |

**Safety**

The number one objective on the Beachie Creek fire was to manage the risk to firefighters (line and COVID 19) and public exposure to fire COVID 19 from incoming resources. Washing hands, wearing masks, and social distancing was emphasized daily in briefings, IAP, line supervisors, and safety officers throughout the day.

A deliberate risk analysis (line hazards/risks) was completed and updated daily. The top four Hazards and/or Missions were identified for the incident: Driving/Traffic, Heat related illness, Extreme fire behavior, Personal hygiene/COVID, and Hazard tree/Chainsaw operations. Mitigations were developed for each of the identified hazards by safety and operations.

The Deliberate Risk Analysis (DRA) was reviewed and updated daily with Operations and Safety staff both at ICP and line. The DRA was discussed daily at the evening planning meeting with the Incident Commanders and Staff plus with Agency Administers and other agencies representatives. Their feedback was incorporated into the analysis.

Medical personnel were assigned to divisions around the fire to treat minor ailments at the end of shift. They were placed in the areas of high activity as determined by medical, safety, and division supervisors. One ALS ambulance was stationed in a central location for line resources. Where IMT forces were in bedded with OSFM resources, we used their medical resources.

A COVID 19 response team was ordered and assigned to the fire to handle any potential COVID case. NWIMT#13 also had a COVID Team which included a COVID liaison, medical unit leader, and safety officer.

NWIMT13 entered a unified command with the OSFM Green Team on 9/8/2020. Their COVID coordinator dealt with COVID compliance at the ICP. Each IMT section was responsible to ensure that it was COVID compliant. Colored wrist bands were given out daily. All persons outside of the ICP module of one was screened at the door to ensure their compliance.

LCES was employed daily on each division. 10 Standard Fire Orders were firm, and 18 Watch Out Situations were mitigated prior to engagement. The IWI form is located on the last page of the IAP.

The professional behavior of the personnel assigned to this incident allowed us to accomplish this assignment with an excellent safety record.

**Human Resources**

**Section Summary**

- This was a difficult fire for the fact we had to evacuate our ICP. That said, the team rallied and came back together strong. It took a few days, but the health of the team stayed strong. The mental attitude was healthy.
- Overall, the personnel assigned to this incident maintained positive attitudes.
- Everyone was social distancing as best as they could, wearing masks, and washing hands.
- There were no medical demobs.
- There are no outstanding personnel issues to report.

**Notable Successes**

- Positive behavior and performance by those on the incident.
- Working with the OSFM Green Team.
- Keeping the ICP COVID free.

**Significant Challenges**

- Second assignment in a COVID atmosphere. Wearing masks and social distancing always was less of a challenge which got better as the days went on.
INFORMATION

Key Decisions
- Changing the name of the fire to the Santiam Fire
- Changing the name back to the original name of Beachie Creek Fire

Significant Events
- ICP was evacuated and the subsequent destruction of Gates OR.
- New ICP established in Salem, OR
- Beachie Creek and Lionshead fires merged in Detroit, OR on September 7/8
- Significant fire damage to communities in the Santiam Canyon area along Hwy 22
- Media tour with OSFM and Marion County Sheriff inside the fire boundary

Notable Successes
- Within one week of ICP lost
  - Elected Official visits from local, state, and federal office holders
  - Establishment of call center
  - Local, National, and Multi national media coordination
  - Audio Visual editing of all meeting as well as Team made products on social media
  - Zoom Meetings
  - Coordination with Sheriff’s Offices and over 12 other agencies
  - Local unit support at ICP

Significant Challenges and Resolutions
- Public anger with the USFS not putting out the Beachie Creek Fire before the wind event.
- Note: New fire starts were responsible for large scale destruction.
- Lack of available resources for Beachie Creek Fire immediately following the wind event.
- Members of the public and media entering the fire boundary.
- Road blocks and checkpoints have been set up but staffing issues persist.
- Coordinated messaging with all cooperating agencies (All agencies have the ability to review the Update prior to release).
- Due to the name change and back again the media and public are using Beachie Creek and Santiam Fire interchangeably.
Operations

Key Decisions

- Indirect approach to control lines was utilized based on recommendation by Type 3/NIMO team after direct approach was turned down by smokejumpers, rappelers, and hotshot crew.
- Established ICP at the town of Gates. Established spike camps at Shady Cove and Fox Group to reduce travel times and for separation to mitigate for COVID-19.
- Extensive communication with local unit with a reliance on local resources.
- Cooperated with ODF to mitigate hazardous fuels and construct hose lay and sprinkler system in the community at Jawbone Flats.
- Structure Protection Group assessed structures in the communities of Gates, Mills City, Lyons to the west and Detroit to the east. Contact was established with local fire agencies and existing structure protection plans were reviewed with the Fire Chiefs.
- PACE Model was developed along with management action points.
- Trigger points were established to respond to forecasted east wind event.
- Pulled resources off the control lines and moved them back to ICP as fire area became unsafe due to high winds.
- High winds and fallen trees created multiple starts in ICP and the Gates Community. IMT personnel engaged in the firefight around camp.
- Due to multiple fire starts in and around ICP the order to evacuate to Mill City was given.
- Due to Mill City being threatened by new starts order was given to evacuate to Stayton.
- Due to Stayton being threatened order was given to evacuate to Salem.
- With loss of ICP and team equipment, NWIMT#13 voted to re-establish a new ICP at Chemeketa Community College and re-engage the fire.
- Established joint operations with Oregon Fire Marshalls Office and their Task Forces.
- Cooperative efforts to share heavy equipment were developed with ODF.
- Opening and maintaining travel infrastructure was priority for first two days after wind event subsided.
- Established divisions A,F,H,K,W, and Z and developed PACE model for western flank of fire.

Significant Events

- Due to forecasted east wind event, the fire increased in size from approximately 500 acres to 132,000 in two days. All IMT personnel were safely evacuated from Gates Fire Camp as multiple ignitions took place in the communities west along the Highway 22 corridor.

Notable Successes

- Local personnel in operations. Having local knowledge improved our overall planning process.
- The firefighting efforts of logistics, plans, finance, and operations folks to control fire around and in ICP.
- Evacuated over 300 people from ICP during high wind event through multiple fire starts, downed power lines, and falling trees without any injuries.
- The resiliency of NWIMT#13 to have loss of personal items, loss of their working equipment, and still choose to stay and re-engage the fire.
- The resiliency of our Division Supervisors to continue working in an effective and efficient manner, while exposed to the stresses of witnessing loss of life and property while also working in COVID-19 environment.

Significant Challenges and Resolutions

- The number of civilians within the fire footprint was tremendous. Cooperation and coordination with them helped to reduce overall risk.
- Communication system went down due to impacts from fire on established repeaters. Cell coverage was utilized to help alleviate this until repeater could be re-established.
- Lack of available resources, especially mid-level management. A collaborative effort and substantial support from the local unit and cooperators helped to alleviate some critical resource needs.
- Lack of opportunities to use aviation resources due to inversions and thick smoke created operational challenges. Local cooperators with heavy equipment helped to expedite the timeframe for putting in control lines and holding fire within its footprint.
- Poor visibility to, from, and on the fire line for extended durations made travel and working conditions hazardous. Tactical pauses were used to allow time for visibility to improve along with reduced driving speeds.
Operations Chronology

Thursday Sept. 3rd NW Team Mobilizes to Beachie Creek
Northwest Incident Management Team 13 was dispatched to the Beachie Creek Fire, Detroit Ranger District Willamette National Forest. Operations personnel arrived at Gates Or. and began gathering intelligence from district personnel and the Type III Incident Commander and to recon on the incident. In-briefing was scheduled for 1800 on Thursday, Sept 3 in Gates OR.
Total Acres: 139 Acres

Friday, Sept. 4th Divisions were established, and assessment of the surrounding area began, preparation work involving local crews continued on FS road 225. Structure protection assessment of the Jawbone Flats Elkhorn Valley and Gates was started. Contacts were made with local area Fire Chiefs. ODF went into Jawbone Flats and started hazardous fuels mitigation assessments on all structures in the area.
Total Acres: 379 Acres

Saturday, Sept. 5th Aerial recon and assessment continued in all areas of the fire. Prep work continued on FS road 2207, 225.
When air quality allowed helicopter bucket work was used to help minimize growth on the fire’s perimeter.
Total Acres: 409 Acres

Sunday, Sept. 6th Aerial recon and assessment continued in all areas of the fire. Prep work continued on FS Road 2207 but was focused at the head of the Opal creek drainage. When air quality allowed, helicopter bucket work was used to help minimize growth on the fire’s perimeter. Two CL-415 Scooper aircraft were ordered to work the fire in anticipation of the forecasted weather.
Smoke conditions and poor visibility on the fire prevented fixed wing water/retardant operations.
Total Acres: 469 Acres

Monday, Sept. 7th Aerial recon and assessment continued in all areas of the fire. Preparation work continued on FS Road 2207.
When air quality allowed helicopter bucket work was used to help minimize growth on the fire’s perimeter. 415 Scooper aircraft were ordered again to work the fire in anticipation of the forecasted weather. Smoke conditions and poor visibility on the fire prevented fixed wing water/retardant operations. After a significant increase in winds from the east, all resources were pulled back to the pavement and to safe operating spots around 1500 hours. Crews returned to ICP around 2000. During the 2100 operational briefing, the wind tipped a tree over onto the powerlines. When the powerline broke, it energized the chain link fence along camp and multiple fires started along the fence. Simultaneously multiple starts were occurring around Fire Camp and the Gates community. All personnel were engaged in suppression, accountability, and efforts to ensure the safety of all firefighters. Each C&G section established accountability of the group. Each group then evacuated to the Stayton High School. IC Click, OSC’s Riener, Neckels, Spencer, & Moore along with FBAN Warner & DIFS Stone and Machado remained to ensure all personnel were safely evacuated. IC Click and OSC Moore remained at the Gates Fire Station to assist with resource coordination. Ultimately the individuals relocated to the High School in Stayton.
Total Acres: 776 Acres, end of shift, prior to wind event and multiple new starts.
Tuesday, Sept. 8th NW Team 13 relocated from Stayton High School to the Keizer Mall for a short period of time, We then relocated to the Chemeketa Community College (CCC) and set up ICP. The OSC’s returned to Gates to retrieve salvageable personnel effects and team equipment. Visibility and air quality on the fire was not suitable for fire crews to work in.
Total Acres: 132,450 Acres,

Wednesday, Sept. 9th Division Supervisors focused assessments on the north and west flank of the fire, new division assignments were established. The main objective for this day was to open the transportation infrastructure so search and rescue operations could begin, and any remaining community members could evacuate safely.
Total Acres: 158,991 Acres,

Thursday Sept. 10th Divisions engaged with OSFM resources. Divisions F & K, resources were pulled back to safe operating positions during the afternoon as the Riverside fire was suspected to merge with our north flank along Division K. Divisions A, Z & W were able to continue working the fire.
Total Acres: 182,324 Acres,

Friday Sept. 11th All divisions engaged on the fire, assessment and actual line construction continue across the fire. Efforts continue with ODF and the OSFM resources in all divisions. Division A worked with local resources to establish control lines in the area of Silver Falls State Park. Division W worked with Weyerhaeuser Lumber to find opportunities to work together to determine line placement in the division and eastward to the Lions Head Fire.
Total Acres: 186,988 Acres
Air Operations

Key Decisions

- Retention of existing aircraft open orders
- Addition of Type 3 recon platform
- Keep the HLCO and limited Type 3 known to time out 9/12 and add an ATGS and Type 1 fixed wing platform (staged in Redmond)
- Security had been requested by previous management, and we continued that request as helibase was immediately adjacent a very active roadway. We did not receive a filled order for 2 SEC2. After the evacuation we did not have security again and it has been listed as a critical fill.
- Examined the option to move from Davis Helibase to Santiam Junction if it would improve the chances of improved visibility due to smoke or marine layers. The decision to move was not supported by an indication it would not increase flyable opportunities.
- To support the district request to have helicopters available for IA, we agreed to launch the Type 2s to RON in Salem on 9/7. Conditions rapidly declined that day forcing one aircraft to relocate to Eugene after finding themselves in IFR conditions midway. The second launched but returned in minutes to Helibase. A Safecom was recorded for the IFR flight.
- New agreements for RON landing areas have been entered into with Albany Municipal Airport, and an operating helibase area in fields south of Silverton. The operating helibase is secured until October 1.

Significant Events

- The UAS A-64 was landing their aircraft and experienced a downdraft damaging the aircraft in a "hard landing". A Safecom was recorded for this event.
- The evacuation on 9/7/2020 forced helibase to be abandoned at 2330.
- Fire activity, downed powerlines and trees, and toxic levels of smoke made return 9/8, and 9/9 unwise. This left aircraft and support equipment on the helibase unsecured.
- On 9/10 helibase was assessed for safety, potential of reburn, and condition of equipment. Other than impacts from civilians passing through helibase, the situation seemed safe from fire, although unsecured. General smoke was an issue and people assessing complained of burning eyes and throat irritation.
- On 9/11 all rolling stock including fuel trucks and service trailers was removed from the helibase to Albany.
- On 9/12 a crew of helitack went into helibase to mop-up stump holes on the north slope on the edge of the airstrip. This was to alleviate fears from landowner who believed our aircraft to be threatened by fire. At no time did fire come out of the timber on that edge.
- Also on 9/12 notification given in the afternoon indicated drone aircraft was being used routinely by law enforcement, but NWMT# 13 had not had any requests for permission to enter the TFR. Attempts were made to reach out to find the responsible parties and open a dialogue to educate. A Safecom was filed to record the growing issue.

Notable Successes

- Evacuation of the helibase occurred in an orderly fashion, with accountability of all agency, and contractor personnel. All arrived safely to CCC.
- Land Use Agreements completed to provide bases for safe air operations that allowed for lessened impacts to civilian air operations.

Significant Challenges and Resolutions

- Fire events with this magnitude attract unauthorized UAS activity under TFRs. It is a full time job with the many large fires to address UAS permissions, coach how to apply for authorized use and address the illegal intrusions to the TFR. There was good communication amongst fire managers and aviation coordinators to seek ways to manage and address intrusions by UAS.
Situation Unit

Key Decisions
- Decision to evacuate the ICP and move to safer location
- Decision was made to increase the capacity of situation unit to meet deadlines

Significant Events
- Sept 4th team took over the fire and GIS started making map product.

Notable Successes
- Not losing any GIS data through numerous power outages, until the evacuation of the ICP.
- Maintained GIS capabilities the entire time and production begun as soon as possible in a safe ICP again.
- There were no injuries or other issues during evacuation of Sitl, GIS, and fire behavior during evacuation.
- Unified Command in the Situation room went extremely smooth, and there was a free exchange of ideas.
- Doubling the staff in the GIS shop helped ease the work load and ability to hit deadlines.
- ICS 209 and IPW was successfully submitted by 1800.
- Infrared flights were successful for the fire and only unfilled one time during NWIMT# 13’s deployment.

Significant Challenges and Resolutions
- Losing all team plotters and printers
- Borrowed plotter from OSFM.

Incident Meteorologist

Key Decisions
- Wind speed forecast 9/7 through 9/9, especially Monday afternoon through Tuesday. Briefed that this offshore episode had the potential of historical magnitude, with gusts up to 70 mph on ridgetops. A Red Flag Warning was already in place and the event was advertised in advance of it’s arrival to the area.

Significant Events
- Offshore event: IMET arrived on site Friday, 9/4. The impending offshore event had been advertised earlier in the week. On the 5th, briefed that this event could be one that occurs once or twice every 100 years. Timing the onset of the east wind was crucial. Mon, the 7th, started sunny at ICP and over the fire, with a slight enhanced down-slope at ICP. At 1400, Beachie Lookout observed east wind around 5-10 mph with gusts to 12 mph. At 1315 IMET issued a weather update for east wind to begin on ridges by 1500 and in the valleys by 1700. By 1630 a wall of smoke had poured over the fire and ICP, due to the strengthening east wind. Shortly after 1630 IMET recorded eye-level gusts 10-15 mph at ICP, which translate to around 25 mph at the 20-foot level.
- The wind continued to increase through the evening, with estimated gusts 30-40 mph at Gates ICP between 1800 and 2000. At 2136, immediately after the Ops de-brief meeting, fire starts had occurred in the front and back of ICP due to downed power lines. Several other fires erupted in the Gates area from downed lines. One of these fires was approximately ¾ mile from ICP and headed in its direction. Shortly after 2200 the decision was made to evacuate ICP. Initially, the meeting point was Mill Creek School, in Mill City, but was changed to Stayton for Safety reasons.

Notable Successes
- Ordering a second IMET was a positive action. The fire size was too large to provide an adequate forecast covering the entire perimeter. The second IMET worked remotely from the Portland Forecast Office, providing forecast products for the east half of the fire. The acquisition of two Incident RAWS stations was beneficial to the forecast process.

Significant Challenges and Resolution
- Limited fire line observations. Beachie Lookout was the only source of field weather.
- No useful RAWS sites within the fire area, at least in the early stages. Boulder RAWS was the closest permanent RAWS site, but not a good wind site because it sits at the bottom of an elevated valley.
- Providing adequate forecast products after the east wind event. The fire area was too large, with a vast difference in weather to be covered by one forecast. A second IMET alleviated this challenge.
- Loss of Gates ICP and IMET-related work items, such as a second computer monitor, IMET cell phone, external hard drive and two Comms-unit radios.
- Acquiring two Incident RAWS was beneficial, especially for the west side of the fire after the east wind event.
Fire Behavior Analyst

Key Decisions
- No engagement of the fire until weather and fire behavior moderated.
- No engagement of the fire until fire was in topography that resources could work in safely.

Significant Events
- Extreme fire behavior occurred with a 22 mile fire run due to the wind event that occurred over September 7th and 8th. The ERC's were at record levels and the topography consisted of steep drainages/river canyons which aided in this major fire run.
- Most of the ICP burned down due to wind and powerlines. Exploding transformers and downed powerlines started wind driven fires within and adjacent to the ICP.

Notable Successes
- No injuries occurred when fire behavior became substantial and camp was evacuated
- Once fire behavior moderated, resources were able to engage in direct and indirect suppression tactics
- LTAN working remotely supporting fire behavior runs in WFDSS

Significant Challenges and Resolutions
- Air resources were not available due to smoke and inversions after the substantial fire run that occurred on September 7th and 8th. Inability to see the fire due to fire size and smoke layer.
- FBAN unable to see fire behavior or had to drive long distances to fires edge.
- Lack of RAWS stations that were near or adjacent to the fire. Two IRAWS were put up on September 12th.
- Multiple large fires within a few miles of each other. The Lionshead fire hit the eastern edge of Beachie Creek, and it was thought that Riverside and Beachie Creek may combine.
- The evacuation and fire at the ICP caused team equipment loss (printers, plotters, phones, computers, tables, chairs, food trucks, showers, supplies, monitors etc.) and personal gear loss. This caused a slight pause in operations.
- ICP was reestablished and supplies were refurbished.
- Limited resources for fire behavior. It was difficult to get daily field data and fire behavior validation due to the size of the fire and smoke impacts.
- Ordered another FBAN or FBAN (t), but were unable to fill those positions. DIVS called in fire behavior validation. FBAN went out in the field every other day.
- WFDSS software not available on some days due to the high load of users

Incident Technical Systems Specialist

Key Decisions
- Evacuation of Gates ICP

Significant Events
- Wind storms caused a powerline to fall and electrify the perimeter fence of the school, igniting multiple fires surrounding the property. Given a directive to leave most of the NWIMT13 equipment and evacuate the site, NWIMT13 lost about 90% of the team IT equipment, totaling about $50,000 of team assets. This equipment was lost in the Gates Upward bound “School”.

Notable Successes
- Regrouped at Chemeketa College, pooled remaining resources, and coordinated with the local IT department to build a functional network and ICP. With the resources provided by the College IT department, remaining equipment on hand, and equipment provided by the OSFM, we were able to provide function for the team. Coordination with the fire cache and delivery of the spare NWIMT1# 11 van and equipment spurred the recovery efforts of the team.

Significant Challenges and Resolutions
- Loss of our resources in the Gates fire created a need for replacement equipment. The challenge was mitigated by the delivery of WA-DNR spare resources from Olympia, WA and the additional equipment provided by the college.
Resources Unit

Key Decisions
- Remote check-in and demob for resources.
- Utilizing the copy service for printing of maps and IAP’s.

Significant Events
- Successful ordering and utilization of the copy service allowed proper work to rest ratio.
- Lost significant amount of resources utilized in the Resource Unit – plotter, printers, computers, forms, kits, and overall basic office supplies, in addition to personal equipment. Able to re-group and make the plan for the shift on September 9th, just a few hours after evacuating ICP
- Utilizing Chemeketa Community College and OSFM resources such as: computers, monitors, paper, staplers and other vital essential items to produce the IAP and other products.

Notable Successes
- After being evacuated and our camp being burned down losing vital resources, able to produce the IAP for the next shift on September 9, 2020.
- Able to gather resources and utilize a variety of sources to gain essential items to be a fully functional unit within hours of evacuation.

Significant Challenges and Resolutions
- After losing our essential equipment in the fire at ICP, the resolution was to search and find resources from a variety of sources to be fully functional within hours of evacuation on very little sleep during a challenging and difficult event.
- Able to go to ICP after it burned and find some equipment that was still usable, e.g. extension cords, staple puller, and some tape.
- Came together as a team after a significant event and were not only fully functional operationally, as well as supportive of each other emotionally in the time after the evacuation. Our team came together as a team for success.
Finance Section

- Priorities identified for Finance; use current incident business policies and guidelines for posting time, managing claims, tracking costs, and provide all information in electronic form, i.e. doc box and payment packages. These priorities have been met through the extent of Team 13’s time spend on the Beachie Creek Fire. Next level of importance was to do everything possible to provide a safe, COVID free environment. Finance identified, documented, and mitigated issues found on a daily basis while taking all precautions to prevent the spread of COVID.

Key Decisions

- The key decision made within the finance unit was to coordinate communication with the Agency Administrator, INBA’s and buying team. Establishing a communication plan between the three entities was the key to our success.

Significant Events

- Day 4 of the incident Sept. 7th, high winds caused down power lines igniting multiple fires around the ICP. Due to multiple spot fires igniting throughout the entire Hwy 22 corridor, the team was forced to evacuate. Much of the teams supplies, equipment, and resources were lost due to the fire.

Notable Success

- Regardless of ICP’s loss, the team was able to come back within ten hours without losing any information. In this special circumstance, the greatest success was using electronic technology. If we weren’t using e-Suite Enterprise and FireNet, the finance unit could have lost all their information and data. Even though the location of the Finance wasn’t destroyed, using Enterprise and FireNet ensured all of our information was backed up, saved and accessible to anyone who was given access.

Significant Challenges and Resolutions

- Separating ICP from spike camps always creates communication barriers. NW Team 13 Finance mitigated those barriers by using the IAP and radio briefings to pass our message to the field. This proved to be very successful. Due to lack of connectivity at the spike camps and base camp, we were unable to electronically transfer time sheets. Finance adapted by using the base camp managers to collect time sheets and PIOs would pick them up and deliver them to ICP daily. Measures taken to prevent the spread of COVID was to collect the time using an envelope and wearing protective gloves. Once the time was delivered to ICP, finance set the tickets in the sun and sprayed them with disinfectant before handling. Each time sheet was then scanned and posted electronically.
Logistics

Food Unit

Key Decisions
- Ordered contract kitchen to support increased numbers starting on 9/6. Evacuation of ICS kitchen staff on the night of 9/7, from the Gates ICP the ICS Kitchen equipment was lost to fire; they returned to the new ICP in Salem on 9/12. No other National Kitchens available, decision with National contract agent agreed to utilize local resources for feeding crews with Team members on per diem during the absences of ICS kitchen.

Significant Events
- Evacuation on the night of 9/7/20 from the Gates ICP was proceeded by a wind event which downed power lines and started several fires at the ICP and other transformers. Rapid fire growth and inability to contain the fire near the ICP, prompted the evacuation of all kitchen staff and food unit leader at approximately 20:15.

Notable Successes
- Keeping the ICS kitchen assigned to the incident while retooling, allowed for continued services from a contract kitchen for the transition to a type 1 IMT.

Significant Challenges and Resolutions
- Providing meals from multiple vendors and managing donations to feed operational crews was resolved by repurposing the school taco bar into a modified incident type 3 kitchen. This kitchen provided meals and lunches, some minor delay occurred, resolved by separating the coffee vendor to hand out coffee that reduced bottle neck at the food pick up window. Other donation continues to be ongoing but are now being directed to the Salem Fairgrounds for public donations.
- OSFM units were not consistent in reporting numbers needing meals, approximately 175 meals were ordered but not consumed due to operations eating at alternate locations. Food unit communicated with OSFM Logs and ask to provide revised numbers to include dinners for unsupported resources.

Medical Unit

- The Medical Unit was compromised of one aid station located at CCC ICP in Salem, OR. Initially it was in Gates, OR but due to the wind event on 9/7-9/8 it was evacuated.
- We did see a steady daily flow of personnel coming in for routine checks, foot needs, Poison Oak, insect bites, sprains and strains, aches and pains, and slight camp crud related to smoke in ICP with no COVID symptoms presented.
- We transported 1 patient from the line with apparent food allergy (Anaphylaxis).
- During this time, we have had 2 ALS Ambulances, 4 EMTF’s, 3 EMPF’s and 2 COVID Specialist (both EMTF’s with BLS line gear) assigned to the fire. All other medical resources being ordered have been UTF’d due to the abundance of incidents.
Communications

Fire Communications was excellent at the beginning of the incident. On 9/7 unprecedented weather conditions created extreme fire behavior. During this event NWIMT# 13’s ICP was evacuated and lost to fire in the town of Gates. Most communications equipment was lost in the fire. Lost equipment is as follows, one NFES 4330 Remote Kit, 13 UHF radios in the NFES 4244 kit, and 2 of the NFES 4381 fiberglass shipping boxes for the VHF Portable Radios. Only one VHF portable radio was lost. At the time of this fire activity, both VHF Command Repeaters were lost along with the Hub and the Aircraft Link. No replacement equipment has been available. Retrieval of the equipment began after fire conditions calmed down on 9/12. The Contingency Group attempted to clear the road accessing Stoney Mtn where the Command 7 Repeater is/was located. Do to a burned wooden bridge, progress was halted and aviation will be necessary to retrieve the repeater. The Contingency Group has been rerouted to clearing the access road up to Halls Ridge for the retrieval of the Hub, Aircraft Link, and the Command 8 repeater. There is major concerns that the communications equipment did not survive the fire, and NIFC has been unable to supply replacement hardware.

Fire line communications was very spotty. The incident is utilizing communications equipment from the OSFM Green Team, and a single Forest Service repeater name Coffin. The OSFM communications equipment has been deployed with a focus on the Western edge of the fire towards the urban interface areas. There are large areas in Div. K without sufficient communications coverage and human repeaters have been utilized since engaging the fire on 9/10. The entire east end of the fire has relied on the FS Coffin repeater. Lions Head fire to the east has also relied on Coffin for communications in the same area so resources are competing for air time.

Cell coverage is good across most areas of the fire on both AT&T and Verizon.

All data is being provided by the college Wi-Fi system.