Based on my recent work on firerelated projects, I have some impressions about the levels of cohesion in different types of fire crews. My impressions are in appendix A. These impressions can be used as hypotheses to guide future studies of cohesion in the different kinds of fire crews. For now, I want to focus on the importance of fire crew cohesion at the stage in firefighting when most fatalities happen. To do this, I need to briefly discuss different types of fires and different stages in fighting fires.

Types of Wildland Fires

According to the Fireline Handbook (National Wildfire Coordinating Group 1998), "typing fires provides managers with additional information in selecting the best resource for the task." Wildfire typing provides managers a context for determining the types of crews to assign to fires. Fires are identified as type I, II, III, IV, and V. The lower the number, the larger and more complex the fire. In other words, type I and II fires are large and complex. Type IV and V fires are smaller and less complex.

Stages in Wildland Firefighting

Each fire is also identified based on the stage of attack. The stages are identified as initial attack, extended attack, and transition.

Initial Attack Stage

The Fireline Handbook describes initial attack as the action taken by resources (people and equipment) that are the first to arrive at the incident. All wildfires that are controlled by suppression forces undergo initial attack. The number and type of resources responding to the initial attack varies depending on the fire danger, fuel type, values at risk, and other factors.

During initial attack, the fires are relatively small, probably type IV or V. District crews will probably be assigned to suppress a small fire. It is not unusual for the initial attack fire crew to have the support of a single resource such as a dozer, engine crew, or some sort of aircraft, (such as a helicopter with a water bucket). Smokejumpers are usually assigned to carry out initial attack on small fires in remote locations. As fires grow in complexity and size, type I crews, type II crews, contract crews, and single resources can be assigned (see appendix A for a description of the types of crews).

Extended Attack Stage

If type IV or V fires are not contained within a 24-hour work shift, or if the fire grows rapidly, the suppression moves from "initial attack" to "extended attack." The Fireline Handbook describes extended attack as:

…a wildfire that has not been contained/controlled by the initial attack forces and additional firefighting resources are arriving, enroute, or being ordered by the initial attack commander. An extended attack fits into the Type III incident as regards complexity.

At this critical transition period when the fire may be expanding, often rapidly, type I crews and single resources can be requested to fight the fire. More type II crews can also be ordered.

The Ambiguous and Dangerous Transition Stage—Fire and People

The "transition stage" is confusing because the fire community uses the word "transition" in two senses. First, transition refers to a time when a fire is changing from a small, type IV or V fire to a much larger type III fire. In ordinary language, this means the fire has grown big. Some fires grow big suddenly. Firefighters use different words to describe this moment: blowing up, taking off, losing control, or making a run. During transition, the fire has quickly expanded beyond the capacity of the resources that were initially assigned to control it.

The Fireline Handbook describes a fire transition stage this way:

Transition from an Initial Attack Incident to an Extended Attack Incident. Early recognition by the Initial Attack IC (Incident Commander) that the initial attack forces will not control a fire is important. As soon as the Initial Attack IC recognizes that additional resources are needed or knows additional forces are enroute, the IC may need to withdraw from direct fireline suppression and must prepare for the transition to the Extended Attack.

The second meaning of transition is a transfer of the command established during initial attack. As new crews and resources are assigned for extended attack, new crew bosses and a new incident commander are placed in control. They establish new strategy and tactics. The Fireline Handbook warns that at this transition stage, "fire crews may need to disengage from fighting the fire." During initial attack, crews are relatively organized. When the fire makes a sudden transition, or blows up, there is an urgent need for organizational controls to make a transition. Two recent studies have found that when both the fire and the firefighting organization are in transition, fire crews are at maximum risk.

Transition and Fatalities— The Munson and Mangan Studies

During the fire transition stage, the fire has grown or is growing rapidly. However, the resources, tactics, strategies, and organizational structures are not yet in place to engage the fire in an extended attack. Perhaps most importantly, intercrew cohesion is not in place either. How dangerous is this period? A recent study, Wildland Firefighter Entrapments (Munson 2000), found that 43 percent of the firefighting fatalities occurred during type IV or V fires. Twenty-nine percent of the fatalities occurred during type III fires. These three types of fires accounted for 72 percent of all wildland fire fatalities from 1976 to 1999. Many of these deaths occurred when fires were rapidly transitioning or had transitioned into type III fires.

Another recent study, Wildand Fire Fatalities in the United States (Mangan 1999), also pointed to the danger of the transition stage. Mangan wrote:

The other dangerous phase of a wildfire is the "transition phase," when the fire has escaped initial attack efforts and higher level incident management teams are being brought in. During this phase some confusion may exist over areas of responsibility; locations of different resources such as crews, engines, or line overhead; or appropriate radio frequencies for tactical operations. This is often the time the fire is exceeding the capability of the initial attack

Mangan points to other reasons why transition stages are so dangerous:

Most of the burnover events occurred during the initial attack or extended initial-attack phase. This is when the firefighters are often involved in independent action, either as members of a small crew, an engine, or even as individuals. The higher levels of incident management teams are not on the scene, communication may be confused, fire weather and behavior conditions may not be widely known or recognized, and the chain of command may not be well established.

My own observations as well as the observations from other recent studies all focus attention on the likelihood of crew cohesion problems during the transition stage in wildfires and in prescribed burns that have gotten out of control.