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Contingent valuation and incentivesAuthor(s): Patricia A. Champ; Nicholas E. Flores; Thomas C. Brown; James Chivers
Source: Land economics. 78(4): 591-604
Publication Series: Miscellaneous Publication
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DescriptionWe empirically investigate the effect of the payment mechanism on contingent values by asking a willingness-to-pay question with one of three different payment mechanisms: individual contribution, contribution with provision point, and referendum. We find statistical evidence of more affirmative responses in the referendum treatment relative to the individual contribution treatment, some weak statistical evidence of more affirmative responses in the referendum treatment relative to the provision point treatment, and no statistical evidence of more affirmative responses in the provision point treatment relative to the individual contribution treatment. The relative credibility of the three payment mechanisms is also examined.
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CitationChamp, Patricia A.; Flores, Nicholas E.; Brown, Thomas C.; Chivers, James. 2002. Contingent valuation and incentives. Land economics. 78(4): 591-604
Keywordscontingent valuation, willingness to pay, non-market benefits, incentives, referenda, open spaces
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