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Cooperative Management of Invasive Species: A Dynamic Nash Bargaining ApproachAuthor(s): Kelly M. Cobourn; Gregory S. Amacher; Robert G. Haight
Source: Environmental and Resource Economics
Publication Series: Scientific Journal (JRNL)
Station: Northern Research Station
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DescriptionWe use a Nash bargaining framework to examine scope for bargaining in invasive species problemswhere spread depends on the employment of costly controls.Municipalities bargain over a transfer payment that slows spread but requires an infested municipality to forgo nonmarket benefits from the host species. We find that when the uninfestedmunicipality has a relative bargaining power advantage, bargaining may attain the first-best solution. However, in many cases a short-term bargaining agreement is unlikely to succeed, which suggests a role for higher levels of government to facilitate long-term agreements even when the details are left to municipalities to negotiate.
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CitationCobourn, Kelly M.; Amacher, Gregory S.; Haight, Robert G. 2019. Cooperative Management of Invasive Species: A Dynamic Nash Bargaining Approach. Environmental and Resource Economics. 72(4): 1041-1068. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-018-0238-8.
KeywordsBioeconomics, Biological invasions, Emerald ash borer, Negotiation, Optimal control, Pest spread
- Cooperative bargaining to manage invasive species in jurisdictions with public and private lands
- Wage differentials among Appalachian sawmills
- Agencies within communities, communities within ecosystems
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